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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20050098-CA
vs.
BRANDON WILLIAMS,
Defendant/Appellee.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the magistrate properly applied Shondel when he concluded that
methamphetamine residue found in a plastic baggie could support both a misdemeanor
charge (possession of drug paraphernalia) and a felony charge (possession of a
controlled substance) and therefore the court was obligated to bind Williams over on the
misdemeanor charge? This issue presents a question of law reviewed for correctness.
State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 146 (Utah App. 1997).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the State's brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
The State appeals from an order by the Honorable Steven L. Hansen, Fourth

District Judicial Court, dismissing a charge of possession of a controlled substance, a
first degree felony.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
On September 28, 2004, Williams was charged in an Amended Information with

possession or use of a controlled substance, a first degree felony, and absconding, a third
degree felony (R. 59-60). At the preliminary hearing on September 28, 2004, Williams
moved to dismiss the first degree felony possession or use of a controlled substance
charge under State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), and to bind over instead on a
charge of misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. The court found probable cause on
the absconding charge and bound Williams over for absconding, a third-degree felony.
Further, the court dismissed the first-degree felony of possession or use of a controlled
substance in a drug-free zone with priors charge and ordered Williams to stand trail on
the Class-A misdemeanor, possession of paraphernalia (R. 129:16-21).
On September 30, 2004, the State filed Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider
Preliminary Hearing Bindover, (R. 51-59), requesting the court to reconsider its decision
on the preliminary hearing bindover. On October 1, 2004, Williams filed a Motion to
Strike Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, based on the fact that a Motion to Reconsider is
not a proper motion (R. 35-36). Further, Williams argued that "[t]he court having made
its decision at the Preliminary Hearing should not now be asked by the state to reconsider
its final judgment when no new evidence has been presented" (R. 36). On October 15,
2

2004, the State filed Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs
Motion to Reconsider, (R. 64-67), requesting the court to find that the plaintiffs motion
to reconsider is provided for under URCP 60 and to den) the defendant's Motion to
Strike Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider (R. 65).
On November 15, 2004, in a Memorandum Decision, the Honorable Steven L.
Hansen ruled that,
In the present case, it is only the existence of the residue that makes the
baggie a drug paraphernalia. Since no other factors were presented] or
argued by the State; this Court has determined that without the residue, the
baggie would have been an innocent object. Since the existence of residue
is the only evidence that can support a charge of either possession of drug
paraphernalia or possession of a controlled substance, then the exact
conduct is being prohibited. Therefore the Shondei Doctrine does apply in
this case and the Defendant must be charged with the offense carrying the
lesser penalty (R. 74).
On February 3, 2005, the State filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal in the
Supreme Court of Utah (R. 102-112), seeking permission to appeal from an interlocutory
order dismissing, under State v. Shondei, the charge of possession of a controlled
substance in a drug-free zone with proper conviction, a first degree felony (R. 112). On
February 22, 2005, Williams filed an Answer in Opposition to State's Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal (R. 119-123). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the State's
petition to the Court of Appeals for disposition (R. 114). Oral arguments were set for
March 8, 2005 (R. 126). The Utah Court of Appeals granted the State's petition. See
Order dated March 9, 2005.
3

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Testimony of Detective Daniel Forrester
On July 27, 2004, Detective Forrester, a detective in the Major Crimes Task Force
for the Utah County Sheriffs Department, (R. 129:14), received an anonymous tip that
Brandon Williams was using and possibly dealing drugs (R. 129:5). Forrester also
received information that Williams was to return to jail by 5:00 pm on July 29, 2004 and
that he had a warrant for his arrest (R. 129:5). Forrester confirmed the information, but
took no action at that time (R: 129:5).
On the evening of July 29, 2004, Forrester contacted the jail to ask if Williams had
returned. After being told that Williams had not returned, Forrester and another officer
went to an address that Forrester had received at the time of the anonymous tip (R. 129:56).
Upon arrival at the residence, at approximately 10:00 pm, Forrester gave the backup officer a photo and a physical description of Williams and asked him to go to the rear
of the residence. Forrester went to the front of the residence and knocked on the door.
Williams answered the door and Forrester took him into custody (R. 129:6).
At the time of the arrest, Forrester searched Williams and located a baggy in his
pocket "containing an amount of crystal substance that had the appearance of
methamphetamine" (R. 129:7). Forrester did a field test on the substance and confirmed
that it was methamphetamine (R. 129:7). Further testing by the state crime lab verified
that the substance in the baggy was methamphetamine (R. 129:7-8). The state crime lab
report did not contain the weight of the substance in the baggy (R. 129:15). Forrester
testified that he does not normally ask for a weight because it is something that the crime
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lab normally provides without asking (R. 129:15). The state crime lab only referred to the
methamphetamine that was uin the residue in the plastic bag" (R. 129:16).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Williams asserts that the magistrate properl} applied Shondel when he concluded
that methamphetamine residue found in a plastic baggie could support both a
misdemeanor charge (possession of drug paraphernalia) and a felony charge (possession
of a controlled substance) and therefore the court was obligated to bind Williams over on
the misdemeanor charge "since there is no probability that a jury could find a felony in
this case" (R. 129:18).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED SHONDEL IN
HIS ORDER DISMISSING THE POSSESSION CHARGE
The Trial Court properly applied Shondel when concluding that the
methamphetamine residue found in the plastic baggie could support both the
misdemeanor charge of possession of drug paraphernalia and the felony charge of a
controlled substance.
The States primary argument is that "the elements of possession of a controlled
substance, a felony, are not exactly the same as the elements of possession of drug
paraphernalia, a misdemeanor, and the magistrate erred in concluding that it was
obligated under Shondel to dismiss the greater crime in favor of the lesser" (App. Br. 5).
In State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), the Utah Supreme Court held that
"[w]here there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is applicable to an
5

offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of the lesser." Id. at 148. The Shondel court
further held that "[t]he well-established rule is that a statute creating a crime should be
sufficiently certain that persons of ordinary intelligence who desire 10 obey the law may
know how to conduct themselves in conformity with it. A fair and logical concomitant of
that rule is that such a penal statute should be similarly clear, specific and understandable
as to the penalty imposed for its violation.'"' Id.
Further, in State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held
that "the criminal laws must be written so that there are significant
differences between offenses and so that the exact same conduct is not subject
to different penalties depending upon which of two stataior) sections a prosecutor
chooses to charge. That would be a form of arbitrariness that is ioreign to our system of
law." Id. at 263.
In State v. Fedorowicz, the Utah Supreme Court held that *c[t]o determine whether
the ... statutes are wholly duplicative, we must determine s\ hether all the
elements of the respective crimes are identical. Thus, we must first determine whether
the mens rea, or intent, element is identical, and then we must determine whether the
same conduct is proscribed." State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67 % 5 L 52 P.3d 1194, 1206
(Utah 2002)(italics added). The court was not saying that the crimes had to be identical,
only that the mens rea and actus reus elements of the crimes had to be identical.
In this case, the mens rea element of both crimes is identical—knowingly and
intentionally. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(l), 58-37a-5(I) and 76-2-102.
It is the conduct (or actus reus element) that the crimes require that is at issue in
this case. Possession of a controlled substance requires possessing or using a controlled
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substance and possession of drug paraphernalia requires possessing >r using any
equipment, product or material intended for use to store a controlled substance. Id.
The trial court correctly focused on the controlled substance vmethamphetamine)
that was found in the baggy and correctly argued that tb[t|he issue oefore this Court is not
whether the residue is sufficient to support a charge of drug possession, but rather,
whether residue alone is sufficient to support two separate charges and whether the
existence of the residue would be an identical prohibition under tne present circumstance"
(R. 75).
In making its determination, the trial court correctly concluded that the baggie
would not have been considered drug paraphernalia without the presence of residue. The
trial court reasoned that although there are 13 relevant factors that are used to consider
whether an object is drug paraphernalia, Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-4, the State
supported its motion by only arguing a single factor—the existence ot residue. Utah Code
Annotated § 58-37a-4(5) (R. 75).
The trial court further reasoned that although the State relied on State v Sorensen,
2003 WL 22020494 (Utah App.), to support its assertion that the presence of ''residue is
not a requirement but rather only a factor to consider," Sorenzen is distinguishable in the
present case—the Sorensen court found other factors were present to make a finding that
the objects were drug paraphernalia without the presence of residue. In the present case,
the trial court considered the remaining 12 factors and correctly determined that without
the residue the baggie could not be considered drug paraphernalia (R. 7 5).
Moreover, the trial court also correctly concluded that iht two cases the State cites
to in primary support for its position-Sfa/e v. VigK 871 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1994), and
State v. Warner, 788 P.2d 1041 (Utaji App. 1990)-to be distinguishable from this case:
7

The first reason is that in both cases the Shondel Doctrine was not raised. "The
issue raised in those cases was whether residue is sufficient to convict for a possession of
controlled substance charge, which is not the issue before this Court9" (R. 75). Second, is
that "although the Shondel Doctrine issue was not raised in either case, it seems apparent
that the Shondel doctrine would have been inapplicable to those cases because of the mere
presence of drugs and additional paraphernalia" (R, 75). Accordingly, Williams asserts
that the trial court correctly found that "a single object ma> not be sufficient for a
determination of being a drug paraphernalia, but the close pro>:imiry of an item to
additional paraphernalia and drugs increases the probability that the item in question is a
drug paraphernalia, with or without the existence of residue" (R. 75-76).
In addition, there were other factors that were present in those cases that are absent
in the present case. In Vigh, the defendant was discovered to be in possession of
approximately one pound of marijuana, baggies, scales, and other drug paraphernalia
which contained cocaine residue. In Warner, the defendant was found to be in possession
of a vial with methamphetamine residue, razor scraper, and white paper bindle containing
a measurable amount of methamphetamine.
In the present case, it is only the existence of the residue that makes the baggie
drug paraphernalia. The trial court correctly held that "[sjince no other factors were
present or argued by the State, this Court has determined that without the residue, the
baggie would have been an innocent object. Since the existence of residue is the only
evidence that can support a charge of either possession of drug paraphernalia or
possession of a controlled substance, then the exact conduct is being prohibited.
Therefore, the Shondel Doctrine does apply in this case and the Defendant must be
charged with the offense carrying the lesser penalty" (R. 76).
8

Williams asserts that the trial court properly applieu the Snondei Doctrine
to this case. The statutes being applied in this case are not "sufficiently certain/' because
there is no "significant difference" between these two ofiense^ ano the same conduct is
being proscribed. The trial court correctly analyzed the issue and applied the correct
statute and punishment to the crime for which Williams has* been accused.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF BOUGHT
Williams asks that this court to affirm the decision of the magistrate's order and
order Williams be bound over for the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia, a ClassA misdemeanor, and absconding, a third degree felony,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21 st day of October, 2005.

Margaret?. Linass}
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to Karen Klucznik, Appeals Division. Utah A^tomey General, 160
East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Uf 84114, this 21 st day
of October, 2005.
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of Utah County State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, & ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 041403028
BRANDON WILLIAMS,
Judge Steven L. Hansen
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on September 28,2004, for a preliminary hearing. At the
conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the Court bound the defendant over to stand trial on Count 1
Possession of Paraphemaha in a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor and Count 2 Absconding,
a third degree felony. On September 3 0,2004, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider the Bindover.
The Court, having reviewed the Plaintiff s Motion to Reconsider the Bindover does hereby make and
enter the following Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACTS
1. On September 28, 2004, a preliminary hearing was conducted wherein the defendant
Brandon Williams ("Williams") was present and represented by Richard Gale, The plaintiff was
represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Timothy L. Taylor.
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2. At the preliminary hearing the plaintiff called Deputy Daniel Forster from the Utah County
Sheriffs Office to testify. Deputy Forster testified thai on 01 abour July 27, 20045 he received a call
from an anonymous person saying Williams was possibly engaged in dealing drugs and that Williams
was noi going to return to the j ail at the conclusion of his temporary release. Deputy Forster contacted
the Utah County Jail and was informed that Brandon Williams had received a temporary release from
custody by a judge from the Fourth District Court and was required to return on July 29, 2004, by
5:00 p.m.
3. At approximately 10:00 p.m. on July 29, 2004, Deputy Forster checked with the Utah.
County Jail and determined that Williams had not returned to the jail. In add] tion to William's failure
to return to jail, Deputy Forster discovered an outstanding felony warrant for Williams issued out of
the 5th District Court of Utah.
4. Deputy Forster obtained a photo of Williams from the Utah County Jail's booking system
and responded to 939 E. 300 S. in Provo with Deputy Cory Wride in attempt to make contact with
Williams. Deputy Forster knocked on the door at the residence and Williams answered. Deputy
Forster was able to immediately take Williams into custody.
5. In searching Williams incident to his arrest, Deputy Forster located a small baggie
containing a crystal substance in Williams' right pants pocket. Williams stated that he didn't know
what was in the baggie and denied the baggie belonged to him.
6. Deputy Forster testified he submitted the baggie to the Utah State Crime Laboratory for
testing. The test results from the crime lab were identified by Deputy Forster, marked as Exhibit #2
and received into evidence without obj ection. The crime lab report indicated' 'Methamphetamine was
identified in the residue in the plastic bag."
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7 Deputy Forster testified that the state crime lab will weigh a substance if the amount is
sufficient to weigh, and that the scales at the crime laboratory can weigh substances in amounts as
small as milligrams. Deputy Forster also admitted that the crime lab only refers to a substance as
residue if the amount is insufficient to weigh with their scales.
8. In addition to providing the court with the test results from the crime lab, Deputy Forster
retrieved the baggie he received back from the crime lab, and the court was able to view the baggie.
9 Deputy Forster testified that Williams was arrested within 1,000 feet of a public park and
an LDS church increasing the penalty for possessing controlled substances in a drug free zone.
10. The plaintiff provided the court with documents indicating Williams had two prior
convictions for controlled substances. The plaintiff marked the convictions as Exhibits #3 and #4 and
the exhibits were received without objection.
11. The defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine Deputy Forster.
12. Counsel for the defendant cited Utah Code Annotated Section 58-3 7a~4(5) and argued that
the legislature anticipated the existence of drug residue on an item of drug paraphernalia because
section 58-37a-4(5) cites "the existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object" as one
of the factors that the trier of fact is to consider when determining whether an item is drug
paraphernalia.
13. Counsel for the defendant further argued that a baggie alone is an innocuous item which
has many legitimate purposes, therefore the baggie could not be considered drug paraphernalia
without the presence of the controlled substance residue.
14. Counsel for the defendant further argued that because the baggie could not be considered
drug paraphernalia without the existence of the residue, and since the same conduct could be punished
as either possession of drug paraphernalia or possession of a controlled substance, Count 1 of the
Information should be bound over as possession of drug paraphernalia. The plaintiff asked the court
to bind the defendant over as charged in the friformation.
3

15. The court determined that based on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, the
baggie only contained residue. The court further determined that the existence of residue on an item
was one of the factors that the legislature anticipated would be considered by the trier of fact in
determining whether an item was in fact paraphernalia. The court concluded because the existence
of residue on the baggie could establish both the crime as a felony and a misdemeanor, under State
v, Sbondel 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), and its progeny, the court was obligated to bind the defendant
over on the misdemeanor.
16. The court did not bind the defendant over for trial on Count 1 Possession of a Controlled
Substance in a Drug Free Zone with Prior Convictions, a first degree felony, but bound the defendant
over to stand trial on Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor.
The court also bound the defendant over to stand trial on Count 2 Absconding, a third degree felony.
17. On September 30, 2004} the plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider Preliminary Hearing
Bindover.
18. On October 1, 2004, the defendant filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Motion to
Reconsider.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On November 17, 20045 the court issued a Memorandum Decision denying the Plaintiffs
Motion to Reconsider the Preliminary Hearing Bindover. The Court considered whether the baggie
would have been considered a drug paraphernalia without the presence of residue. The Court
concluded that under Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37a-4(5) there are 13 factors which the trier
of fact may consider in determining whether an item is drug paraphernalia, and the state only argued
one factor, the existence of a controlled substance residue. Under these facts, as distinguished from
the cases cited by the state, the court held that because the baggie could not be considered
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paraphernalia without the existence of the residue then the ; Shondel Doctrine," as set forth in the case
of State v Shondel, 453 P 2d 146 (Utah 1969), applied to the present case.
The court reasoned that "a single object [may or] may not be sufficient for a determination of
being a drug paraphernalia, but the close proximity of an item to additional paraphernalia and drugs
increases the probability that the item in question is a drug paraphernalia, with or without the
existence of residue. The court ruled, uSince the exisience of residue is the only evidence that can
support a charge of either possession of drug paraphernalia or possession of a controlled substance,
then the exact conduct is being prohibited. Therefore, the Shondel Doctrine does apply in this case
and the Defendant must be charged with the offense carrying the lesser penalty."
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the court hereby Orders that
Count 1 of the Information be bound over as Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone,
a class A misdemeanor, and Count 2 be bound over as Absconding, a third degree felony. Defendant
is ordered to stand trial on the matters.

Signed this

J r / day of January, 2005.
/

ljf/\

;?' ?r&S

*

Judge Steven L. Hansen { -/^ *i. .!:-. *"?,
Fourth District Court Judge _*''•.
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